is evidently Hogben's belief that the logical structure of both inquiries is, and should be, essentially similar; and, since his faith in the adequacy of strictly mechanistic explanation in the inanimate world remains unshaken by all the earthquakes staged by modern physicists, this answer means for him that mechanistic science must swallow up biology. But it is equally open to his opponents to accept this positive answer and at the same time to hold, with Whitehead and J. S. Haldane, that in the end biology must swallow up physics, imposing upon it reforms of method which will assimilate the physical to the biological sciences. Thus Whitehead : ' The effect of this sharp division between nature and life has poisoned all subsequent philosophy. Even when the co-ordinate existence of the two types of actualities is abandoned [i. e. when Vitalism and Animism and Dualism are rejected] there is no proper fusion of the two in most modern schools of thought. . . . The doctrine that I am maintaining is that neither physical Nature nor life can be understood unless we fuse them together as essential factors in the composition of " really real" things whose interconnections and individual characters constitute the universe. . . . We require that the deficiencies in our concept of physical Nature should be supplied by its fusion with life. And we require that, on the other hand, the notion of life should involve the notion of physical Nature.' And Haldane: £ Modern physical investigation of the atoms and molecules seem to be

endowing them with something very like individual life.' And again: ' If a meeting-place between biology and physics be some day found, and one of the two sciences be swallowed up, that one will not be biology.'

And Prof. A. Meyer maintains that the fundamental